for a review). These factors can generally be understood as representing a broader distinction between attributing outcomes primarily to skill or chance. In many common activities, this distinction is important but difficult to judge, even requiring empirical study (e.g. playing poker, Croson, Fisherman & Pope 2008 , Levitt & Miles 2011 ; financial fund management, Fama & French 2010) . Different people may, in fact, reach different conclusions about whether skill or chance determines a specific future outcome.
As we will confirm in a pilot study, differences in people's attributions of a given outcome to skill or chance will affect that person's recency beliefs. When skill is emphasized, people may infer that, since recent outcomes can be informative of the current level of skill, future outcomes will reflect recent outcomes, yielding positive recency. However, when chance is emphasized instead, people may anticipate that outcomes will balance out, even in a short sequence (per the "law of small numbers", Tversky & Kahneman 1971) , and thus predict future outcomes that differ from recent outcomes, yielding negative recency. Although this framework is intuitive and is suggested by prior findings, a thorough literature review failed to reveal any research relating beliefs in skill vs. chance in a single context to the adoption of different recency beliefs. Therefore, in the pilot study we will manipulate recency beliefs by merely framing the mechanism of a specific task in a fixed context as either skill or chance. Confirming the effect of this manipulation on recency beliefs will facilitate testing our main hypothesis, that the anticipation of future outcomes impacts preference for options representing self-relevant change.
"Managing" the future -from predictions to self-relevant change
Given that the self is central in causal inferences (Langer & Roth 1975; Ross & Sicoly, 1979) , the change (vs. consistency) of the actor's identity may be highly relevant to recency inferences. While the past and future outcomes of a given person will usually be seen as constituting the same sequence, we propose that a change in the person can disrupt the coherence of the perceived sequence, impeding recency inferences. As a result, when one player literally replaces another in a game, we predict that recency beliefs will be suppressed, which we test in the pilot study.
Further, we propose a parallel between inter-personal and intra-personal change, such that selfrelevant changes which signify a shift in personal identity may similarly suppress recency inferences. As a result, when people are pessimistic about future outcomes due to the combination of prior outcomes and their recency beliefs, self-relevant change will seem more appealing. This proposition is consistent with current views of personal identity which describe a multi-faceted and malleable conception of the self (Markus & Wurf 1987) , such that people shift their identity in response to external cues (Brewer & Gardner 1996; Ramírez-Esparzaa et al. 2006 ) and anticipated changes in identity can, in turn, affect choices for the future (Bartels & Urminsky 2011) .
Our proposed hypothesis implies that people will select change in the self when they are pessimistic about a future outcome, but avoid change in the self when optimistic. To test this, we manipulate recency beliefs to induce pessimism or optimism after a given outcome and compare people's choices for self-relevant options that represent change or consistency. Choices constitute a common means of self-representation (Ariely & Levav 2000; Kim & Drolet 2003) , with different choices reflecting different aspects of one's identity (Stephens, Markus & Townsend, 2007) . We test our hypothesis with consumption choices in Study 1, and with choices between consistency and change in self-description in Study 2. We find that options representing a change in self-representations are chosen differently in pessimistic vs. optimistic situations. When a pessimistic future outcome is anticipated, people prefer options reflecting self-relevant change, as if to "thwart fate", but when an optimistic future outcome is anticipated, people prefer options reflecting self-consistency, as if to "embrace fate". Thus, our proposed framework (see Figure 1) incorporates insights from two literatures that have previously been treated as largely unrelated: personal identity and belief formation in sequences of outcomes, enabling us to better understanding how people predict and "manage" future outcomes.
Pilot Study: Recency effects disrupted by identity-change
In this pilot study, we employed a hypothetical ball-throwing game, manipulating the mechanism framing (skill vs. chance), recent outcomes (success vs. failure), and identity consistency (same vs. different) in a 2x2x2 between-subjects design. The purpose is to confirm that, per our framework, the combination of mechanism beliefs and recent outcomes determines people's anticipations of uninterrupted future outcomes but, a shift in the player's identity suppresses these recency effects.
Method
Students (N=170) from a large public university in China filled out a brief questionnaire in exchange for a candy snack. Participants were asked to imagine visiting an amusement park with a friend and playing a game in which they could win a prize. The goal of the game was to throw a ping-pong ball into a basket that was moving back and forth at a random speed (stimuli for all studies are in the Appendix). All participants were told that the probability of scoring a basket each time was roughly 50%, so that the perceived game difficulty would be held constant.
We framed the game as either determined by chance or skill, based on the name of the game ("Lucky Shooting" vs. "Master Shooting") and the accompanying promotional slogan. Participants were told to imagine that they and the friend decided to play six rounds together, that either they had initially started to play or the friend had started, and that the first player got either two hits or two misses. In the same-player conditions (N=87), participants were asked to predict the outcome of the next shot (hit or miss), performed by the same player. In the different-player conditions (N=83), they were told that they had switched places with their friend and were asked to predict the next shot performed by the other person (i.e., the participant taking over for the friend or the reverse). Since, we found no effect of who the initial player was (self vs. other), we collapsed across the initial player's identity.
Results
When participants predicted the same player's future performance, analyses validated our prediction: more participants in the skill-framing condition predicted the same future outcome as the prior outcomes (71.4%, Figure 2a) , while slightly more participants in the chance-framing condition predicted that the next outcome would be the opposite of the prior outcomes (57.8%). Logistic regression of the predicted outcome revealed the predicted two-way interaction between mechanism framing and recent outcomes (β=-2.48, Wald=7.30, p<.01). When the other player took over after the first two rounds, however, the recency effects were suppressed, such that all the predictions across the four conditions were highly similar and close to 50% (Figure 2b ), and the two-way interaction between mechanism framing and recent outcomes was no longer significant (β=.693, Wald=.612, n.s). Overall, we found the predicted three-way interaction among mechanism framing, recent outcomes and identity consistency (β=3.17, Wald=6.19, p<.05).
Our findings confirm that when an outcome's mechanism is ambiguous, people's recency beliefs are highly malleable, such that merely reframing the same game as based on skill or chance reverses judgments of the next outcome. More importantly, these beliefs hold when the same player will continue the game, but recency beliefs are eliminated when a different player will take over for the next outcome.
Based on these results, in the next two studies we use variation in recent outcomes and manipulations of mechanism beliefs to induce pessimism or optimism about future outcomes. We then test our hypothesis that people prefer choices symbolizing a shift in self-representation when circumstances imply pessimistic future outcomes, but not when circumstances imply optimistic future outcomes.
Study 1: Recency effects on self-relevant choices between the usual and the novel
In many everyday choices, selecting a usually-chosen option signals consistency of identity, whereas choosing a novel but equally preferred option can signal a shift in the salient aspect of one's identity. Our framework therefore predicts that a novel option will be preferred over the usually-chosen option in pessimism-inducing circumstances, but not in optimism-inducing circumstances. Furthermore, if the anticipation of a negative future outcome underlies a preference for identity-relevant change, as proposed, then this pattern should only hold when an uncertain future outcome is anticipated. Conversely, if our findings are instead explained by other factors, such as negative affect due to pessimism, the effects should persist even without the presence of a future outcome.
We test these hypotheses in a hypothetical setting (a gambler at a casino ordering a drink) with a 2 (mechanism framing) X 2 (recent outcomes) X 2 (future outcome present vs. absent) between-subjects design. In the future-outcome conditions, we predict a two-way interaction between mechanism framing and recent outcomes on the choice of drink. The outcome-absent conditions are predicted to represent a boundary condition, in which the independent variables will have no effect on choices.
Method
We collected 203 complete and valid surveys from U.S. adult online participants paid $1 1 .
Participants were asked to imagine they were playing blackjack in a Las Vegas casino, a game which plausibly contains aspects of both skill and chance (Wagenaar 1988) . They were shown a pamphlet which introduced the rules of blackjack, featuring photos and quotes from previous winners that emphasized either skill or chance.
Participants then read a scenario in which they had bought five (future-outcome conditions) or four (outcome-absent conditions) $10 chips, and would play each chip in one round. In the scenario, after having lost (or won) in each of the first four rounds, they felt thirsty and chose between a usual option ("the drink that you usually like and often order") and a novel option ("an unusual drink that you have never tried before but have always wanted to"). A separate pretest confirmed that this choice between usual and novel options is seen as identity-relevant (see Appendix). In the future-outcome conditions, this 1 A few participants (detailed in the Appendix) failed a test of reading attention (Study 1 and Study 2 Pretest) or guessed that components of the study were related (Study 2) and were excluded. choice occurred before playing the last chip, while in the outcome-absent conditions, the choice occurred before leaving the casino.
Results
In the future-outcome conditions, we found the predicted two-way interaction between mechanism framing and recent outcomes on choice. When the game was either framed as skill and the player had been losing or the game was framed as chance and the player had been winning, participants were more likely to choose the novel drink (logistic regression β=1.78, Wald=4.22, p<.05, Figure 3.) However, in the outcome-absent conditions, we found no interaction (β =-1.51, Wald=2.20, n.s.) The absence of a future outcome debiased the effect of recency on choice, as demonstrated by a three-way interaction among mechanism framing, recent outcomes and the presence of a future outcome (β =-3.29, Wald=6.07, p<.05). None of the findings were attributable to differences in the characteristics of the drinks participants were considering (e.g., healthiness, indulgence).
In Study 1, we found that when and only when a future outcome is present, the factors affecting participants' recency beliefs influenced their preference between usual and novel options, although the choices could not influence the future outcome. We theorize that these choices reflect participants' preference to either maintain or shift the salient aspect of their self-identity. To more directly test this proposition, participants in Study 2 were given either a choice regarding self-descriptions or a control choice task when facing actual impending outcomes in an unrelated game.
Study 2: Choosing change in self-representation
For this study, we designed a ball-rolling game that participants could play for real rewards. A table was marked with a red starting line and ten small rubber erasers were scattered in a blue target area at the opposite end ( Figure 4 ). Players rolled an irregularly shaped rubber-band ball from behind the red line, trying to land the ball inside the target area. Based on initial testing, participants were told that approximately 50% of rolls succeed. This game incorporates elements that represent both skill (the participant's aim and force of the roll) and chance (the irregular ball and the rubber erasers).
First, in a pretest, we manipulate mechanism framing and recent outcomes and measure observers' anticipation about the next outcome (degree of optimism or pessimism), to confirm that the recency effects found in the pilot study extend to this setting. Then, in the main study, we investigate the impact of these factors on participants' decisions whether to change self-descriptions during the game (Version A). We predict that, after providing an initial self-description and starting to play the game, people would be more likely to describe a different aspect of themselves (vs. elaborating on the same aspect) if their recency beliefs and recent outcomes implied pessimism (vs. optimism) about the next outcome. We also conducted two control conditions to test whether self-relevance is crucial for the finding. In Version B, participants instead chose whether to change descriptions of other people's identity, and in Version C participants instead chose between different colors of balls to use in the game.
Pretest: Recency framing impacts the anticipation of future outcomes
Sixty-one adult U.S. participants completed an online survey for $1.50. Participants first saw pictures of the game and the basic rules, and then read additional information emphasizing either the role of skill or of chance in the game. They rated their degree of pessimism vs. optimism about the next outcome on a 10-point Likert scale after imagining making two hits, and again after imagining two misses (counterbalanced within-subjects). ANOVA analysis predicting the outcome anticipation rating revealed the same predicted two-way interaction as in the pilot study between manipulated mechanism framing and recent outcomes (F(1, 59)=6.82, p<.05, η p 2 =.12, Figure 5 ).
Main study: Recency impacts change in identity-descriptions
Method assistant, who was blind to the hypotheses, conducted the two seemingly unrelated studies with each participant individually. In Version A (N=76), participants first filled out a one-page "self-identity" survey, in which they were asked to list three different aspects of their personal identity and briefly describe one of the three. Then, in another room, each participant played the ball-rolling game, described as a pretest for a future study. Participants were told that after one practice roll they would do seven rolls in the game and could win $1 for scoring at least four times. After the practice roll and three "real" rolls, the experimenter asked the participant to stop and give feedback on their impressions of the game. They read a page of information characterizing the game as based on either skill or chance (as in the pretest)
and were asked to list other games that they thought were similar.
Next, the experimenter asked the participant to complete Part Two of the "self-identity" survey, before resuming the game. The survey asked participants to write in detail about an aspect of personal identity, either the aspect already briefly described earlier or one of the other two aspects initially listed.
Participants then played the last 4 rolls of the game, completed demographics and potential covariate measures, and were paid based on their performance.
Versions B (N=78) and C (N=78) were conducted in subsequent waves in the same lab, under the exactly same conditions (see Appendix). In Version B, participants instead described aspects of another person's identity (a self-irrelevant task). They first listed three different strangers they have seen for a moment that day and briefly describe one of the people. Then, during the mid-game break, they chose whether to describe in detail the same person or one of the other people they had listed.
In Version C, instead of the writing task, participants were asked to choose among rubber-band balls of different colors to use in the game (an identity-irrelevant task). At the start of the game, participants were shown three otherwise identical rubber-band balls (yellow, orange and blue), and were randomly assigned to use one. During the mid-game break, they chose whether to continue using the same ball, or to replace it with one of the other two.
We predicted that participants would be more open to (or even proactively express) change specifically in the self (Version A, but not Versions B or C) when their recency beliefs implied pessimism about the future outcome, as if such change could "thwart fate". However, if participants instead favored change in the writing task as a means to reestablish control (Whitson & Galinsky 2008 ), then we should replicate our findings in Version B. Moreover, if non-self-relevant changes likewise disrupt recency effects, we should replicate our findings in Versions B and/or C. The comparison among the versions provides a critical test of the necessity of self-relevance to our findings.
Results
Manipulation checks confirmed that the game was seen as involving more skill and less chance after the skill-framing than after chance-framing (see Appendix). In Version A, consistent with our prediction, most participants (75%) who did poorly (0 or 1 hits) in the skill condition and most of those (65%) who did well (2 or 3 hits) in the chance condition chose to describe a different identity aspect, compared with those doing well in the skill condition (50%) or those doing poorly in the chance condition (56%). We found a two-way interaction between mechanism belief and the number of recent hits in a logistic regression of choice to change (β=.575, Wald=4.56, p<.05, Figure 6a .)
In contrast, we found no interaction between mechanism framing and recent outcomes on participants' choice of consistency vs. change in Version B (logistic regression β=-.087, Wald=.036, n.s., Figure 6b ) or in Version C (logistic regression β=-.229, Wald=.684, n.s., Figure 6c ). Comparing Version A to the two control versions (B and C), we find the predicted three-way interaction among mechanism belief, recent outcomes, and self-relevance of change (β=-1.352, Wald=4.561, p<.05).
Discussion
These results support our claim that the effect of pessimism-inducing (vs. optimism-inducing) circumstances on the preference for change in Version A was due to a desire for specifically self-relevant change. Contrary to the view that participants in pessimistic circumstances were motivated to exert control over the situation by making any symbolic change, the effect did not occur when participants could make a self-irrelevant change.
The results of the pretest and main study suggest that preferences for self-relevant change are enhanced by pessimistic anticipations, which arise from a combination of mechanism belief and recent outcomes. In conditions yielding pessimism, our participants shifted the self-representation they chose to write about, while in conditions yielding optimism, they described a consistent self-representation. These findings are consistent with the intuition that self-relevant changes may be perceived as an intuitive "switch" of fate, such that if the person's identity changes, then "fate" also changes. Notably, these changes did not affect the outcome: success in the last four rolls was the same whether participants chose to describe the same or a different identity-aspect (40.3% vs. 41.8%, t=-.23, n.s.).
A potential concern is that, for participants anticipating negative outcomes, the choice to describe a different identity aspect might have been affected by a desire to enhance themselves (Dagrou, Gauvin, & Halliwell 1992; Hardy 2006) , or to protect self-integrity by affirming an alternative aspect of the self (Steele 1988 ). Contrary to these accounts, we find no difference in an independent coder's ratings of the participants' first versus second identity-descriptions (overall or by condition) as positive, confident, virtuous or in-control. Furthermore, based on the lack of moderation by relevant individual difference measures, our findings are also not explained by superstition, perceived control, mood or novelty-seeking (see Appendix).
General Discussion
Our findings shed light on how anticipations of future outcomes are formed, and how these anticipations can affect seemingly irrelevant decisions. An interesting unanswered question is whether participants' choices represented a conscious and deliberate attempt either to "thwart fate" or to "embrace fate". Alternatively, pessimism may simply have made self-relevant change seem more attractive, perhaps because change is often followed by a reduction in pessimism as recency-based inferences become less persuasive.
Some prior research has shown that imposing changes to the mechanism can attenuate certain recency effects (e.g., swapping coins in a coin flipping game attenuates the gambler's fallacy, Gold & Hester 2008) . In contrast, we speculate that the self-relevant change studied here may need to be freely chosen to effectively disrupt recency inferences, since imposing a shift in one's self-identity may be externalized as part of the unfolding outcomes.
One challenge for future research is the difficulty inherent in simultaneously measuring predictions, intentions and choices. Eliciting participants' predictions before choice could affect the perceived inevitability of the outcome and thereby impact subsequent choices. Moreover, people may either refrain from optimistic predictions due to reluctance to "tempt fate" (Risen & Gilovich, 2007) or favor optimistic predictions due to desirability bias (Windschitl et al, 2009 ).
Our findings have interesting implications for several related domains. For research on selfidentity, we show that expressions of one's identity can be affected by cues from private decision contexts, beyond the widely-studied impact of social and cultural expectations. For decision making, our research suggests that the identity-expressive aspect of choice may play a surprising role in seemingly unrelated decision phenomena, such as recency effects. We believe the theoretical implications and the boundaries of these effects, among others, are important topics for future research.
Anticipated future outcomes may also affect self-relevant choices more broadly, ranging from how people publicly describe and represent themselves, to their loyalty to identity-relevant brands and services, and even to choices between highlighting or changing salient in-group or out-group social identities. Both the person who holds an optimistic view of her future and values stability, and the person who anticipates a bleaker future and is tempted by any fresh start may be motivated by the same fundamental intuition: with a different me comes a different fate, for better or worse.
APPENDIX A Notes on study design and data
The pilot study was conducted at a large public University in China during summer vacation. We found no effect of the initial player's identity on the prediction of the future outcome ( and four participants in the Study 2 Pretest (6.1%) failed the test and were excluded. The results with these participants included are very similar.
Study 2 was conducted in three sequential waves (first Version A, then B, then C) in a research lab in a large Midwestern city. All participants were from the same subject population and were run individually using the same lab rooms and experimental setup, by the same research assistant.
Comparison of all common measures (demographics, game outcomes, manipulation checks and other individual differences) revealed no significant differences across the three waves.
Study 2 was presented to participants as two unrelated studies (in Versions A and B), among other studies being conducted in the same lab. We tested to see whether participants suspected a link between the two parts and we eliminated nine participants (4 in Version A, 1 in Version B and 4 in Version C) who indicated suspicion. The findings were similar when these participants were included.
Manipulation checks
In Study 1, to confirm that the choice between usual and novel drinks corresponded to different self-representations, we conducted a brief online pretest (N=60) with the same population. In one version (N=30), 77% agreed that choosing an option that the person usually chooses over one that the person has never chosen before represents more of a shift in self-identity (vs. 50%, p<.01). In the other version (n=30), specifically in the context of choosing a drink in a casino, 90% agreed that the novel drink would represent more of shift in self-identity (vs. 50%, p<.001).
In addition, we developed a 6-item measure (alpha = .65; see Appendix B), and found that participants were more likely to agree with statements suggesting that making different choices represents different aspects of people's self-identity (M=5.04, on a 7-point scale) than with statements suggesting that different choices have no bearing on identity (M=2.94, paired t(59)=11.64, p < .001).
In Study 2, we confirmed that our manipulation affected beliefs about whether the outcomes of the ball-rolling task were determined by skill or chance. First, we asked participants (after the DV) to rate on a 7-point chance-to-skill scale which they believed played more of a role in the game. Participants' ratings were consistent with the manipulation intention in both the pretest (M skill =5.9, M chance =2.7, F(1,59)=86.0, p<.001) and in the main study (M skill =5.42, M chance =4.38, F(1, 228)=26.17, p<.001).
Secondly, during the mid-game break in Study 2 we asked participants to list another game similar to the one they were playing. A research assistant (who was blind to the condition) rated the listed games on a chance-to-skill scale and confirmed the effect of the manipulation (M skill =3.46, M chance =3.05, F(1, 184)=11.12, p<.05).
Alternative accounts of shifts in choices
In the paper, we argue that participants' preference for choices representing a shift in the salient aspect of self-identity is driven by the pessimistic anticipation of future outcomes. Alternatively, it may be argued that the preference for change in situations which yield pessimism occurs for unrelated reasons, such as feeling a lack of control, coping with self-threat, superstitious beliefs, or negative mood. First, we have identified two boundary conditions that are broadly inconsistent with these accounts: our results do not extend to choices in the absence of future outcomes (Study 1) or to choices that are not self-relevant (Study 2). We also rule out these accounts more directly.
For the lack of control account, we measured locus of control (LoC) in Study 1 and Study 2. We find no effect of our manipulations on LoC and no moderation of our findings by LoC. Further, in Version A of Study 2, the independent coder rated the participants' first and second self-descriptions on several dimensions (in-control, positive, virtuous, boastful). Between participants who chose to describe the same vs. another aspect of the self, the degree to which the first description indicated more or less control than the second descriptions did not differ (F(1,74)=.01, n.s.). This suggests that participants' choices could not be explained by an intention to describe oneself as more in-control.
Likewise, we found that the degree to which the first description was more or less boastful, positive or indicative of virtuousness than the second did not differ by condition or between choices to describe the same vs. another identity aspect in any version of Study 2. This suggests that the results cannot be explained by change of self-description being used for either mood repair or spontaneous selfaffirmation. The results in Study 1 were also incompatible with such alternative explanations, since a response to self-threat should also occur in the absence of a future outcome.
Another possibility is that the observed choices reflect superstitious beliefs about luck. As a general test, we measured participants' beliefs about the existence of luck and their own personal luck in Studies 1 and 2, and neither moderated our findings. We also tested whether our results could be explained by a specific superstition that virtuousness would yield more positive outcomes (Converse, Risen & Carter, 2011) . In Study 1, a subset of the participants (N=118) identified the specific drinks they were thinking of, for the "usual" and "novel" drink options. We found no difference between participants' ratings of the two drinks on indulgence or healthiness, and no effect of our manipulations on the ratings of the drinks. Similarly, we found no relationships between our findings and the relative virtuousness of participants' first and second self-descriptions in Study 2.
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